On 18 May 2009, the prolonged separatist conflict in Sri Lanka between
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Government of Sri Lanka
(GOSL) came to an end with the death
of the LTTE Leader Vellupillai Prabhakaran (VP).
The demise of the LTTE, one
of most ruthless terrorist groups in the world signalled
the conclusion of one of the most turbulent periods of Sri Lanka’s history. The
LTTE had been a powerful military force, and had controlled territory running a
civil administration in the north and east of Sri Lanka for many years. The Muslims in particular had suffered at
the hands of the LTTE in the late eighties and early nineties with the mosque
massacres in the east of the country and being expelled from the north. Thus
its end symbolized an opening of a window of opportunity, albeit with some
uncertainty, for the country’s future, in terms of trust building and
reconciliation between increasingly suspicious and polarized communities.
The 28 year old conflict extenuated
already fragile cracks between the different ethnic groups, along faith lines,
such that identity was strengthened not only by an insecurity of religious
affiliation but a religious affiliation that is borne from a sense of the
‘other’ who is not only someone of a different ethnicity but someone of a
different religion. Like many post-colonial societies, Sri Lanka drew on
pre-colonial culture, including religion, to form a national identity after
gaining independence. These post
colonial identities subsequently contributed to the conflict and have been
abused and manipulated by the political elites to justify certain actions. This
insecurity of identity has been felt on all sides, but the Sinhala Buddhist,
who form the majority of the population, exhibit the most extreme of
strains. In particular the ideological strand of
Theravada Buddhism in Sri Lanka has undergone a massive change and
reinterpretation of its doctrines not only as a result of the conflict, but also
by the political and social climate which has
resulted in the steady growth of political activism on the part of a new
generation of Buddhist monks. This means that the Sinhala Buddhist has become
more militant, violent and ultimately intolerant towards other ethnicities and
religions, largely led by the clergy. The past three and a half years has seen a
rise of violence against religious sites and members of religious communities,
with a number of incidents including mob attacks on places of worship;
robberies and vandalism; the killing of clergy; protests against communities
and the proliferation of hate speech on social media, the internet and via the
audio – visual media. In particular
once again it seems to be the Muslim community that is the main target
from both a commercial, social and religious perspective with some high profile
cases such as the attack on a mosque in Dambulla in Sri Lanka in 2012. In addition there have been many more
incidents that have received little or no attention, either locally or
internationally. Of the accounted reports,
there are 65 cases of attacks on places of religious worship with all the
minority religious communities bearing the brunt of the violence, the majority being from the
Christian community (mostly against the non-traditional churches accused of
forced conversion); Buddhist temples from the non Theravada sect; Hindu places
of worship and the Muslim community. At
the front of this coordinated hate campaign is an extreme Sinhalese Buddhist
organisation called Bodhu Bala Sena (BBS), enjoying tacit support from the
Government. This
rising anti Muslim rhetoric over the
last few years have involved public meetings, the distribution of pamphlets and
articles in mainstream Sinhala and English papers which have ‘borrowed’ rhetoric
being used globally to demonise and stereotype Muslims (especially by
Islamophobes in the west). There are
also rumours that on a recent visit to the USA, the BBS were scheduled to have
met Pamela Geller as well.
It is an irony that this anti Muslim movement are oblivious to the lived experience of the Sri
Lankan Muslim society which has over 1000 years of coexistence in the country
and contributing at all levels of the State.
However it is clear that the movement is aimed at hitting the Muslim community
in areas that aim to ‘decrease’ their visibility and thereby the ‘threat’ to
Sinhala identity and ultimately Sri Lanka (in the eyes of the
protagonists). By declaring Sri Lanka as
a ‘Sinhala only’ country, those perpetrating this mindless rhetoric of Sinhala supremacism presuppose the acceptance of
Sri Lanka as a land sacred to Buddhism with Sinhala Buddhists as its chosen
people. According to this vision, minorities, including Sinhala Christians are
not co-owners or even guests (because guests have to be given certain
privileges and rights) but they are second class serfs (untouchables) who
should thank the benevolent majority for being given the chance to live
there. In so doing, these organisations have completely rewritten the rich history
of a country whose mosaic is made up of different ethnicities, faith and
culture. They have chosen to rewrite a history of the accumulation of unfinished business, the piling
up of debts and the stacking up of fortunes and misfortunes.
Whilst it is true that Sri Lanka is the only place in which there are
Sinhalese and where the Sinhalese language is spoken, this doesn’t equate to
ownership of the island solely by one race or another nor does it speak of the
rich inter mingling of all races and faiths that influence much of Sri Lankan
culture, food, art and music today. It
also does a huge disservice to the Buddhist way of life which is about peace,
tranquillity and tolerance of others.
Declaring Sri Lanka Buddhist doesn’t preclude it from having minorities of
other faiths and ethnicities coexisting with equal rights.
Of course, questions need to be also asked of the Muslim community in
terms of their isolationist attitudes which have led to large misperceptions
about them and their practices. Despite
a history of coexistence, the past 30 years have seen more communities living
in parallel to each other. The BBS
movement have brought to the fore basic ignorance about the rituals and practice of Muslims. In addition the inability of the community to
define a home grown organic identity and instead adopting more of an identity
similar to that found in the Middle East caused a lot more questions. One such question that the Muslim community
will have to discuss and deliberate on is the whole issue of a national
identity vs. religious obligations.
Their commitment to the process of reconciliation of Sri Lanka should
not be questioned at the expense of their identity.
The Muslim issue in particular adds an additional significant
challenge to Sri Lanka’s external relationships especially as in the recent and
distant past; it has been the Muslim world which has been supportive of the
country on the international sphere. In
addition, with the significant amount of income coming from Sri Lankans
employed in the Middle East, the destination for Sri Lankan exports and Middle
East tourism, the challenges faced by the Muslim community will only serve to
deteriorate Sri Lanka’s international standing even further.
Thus for Sri Lanka to move forward, it will need to have some serious
deliberations on the path it chooses to take.
The Muslim community themselves have a role to play in this, but will
have to exorcise some internal demons as well.
